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Fitzgerald and Froelke: An Examination of Two Aspects of the NLRB Election

AN EXAMINATION OF TWO ASPECTS OF THE NLRB
REPRESENTATION ELECTION: EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES
AND BOARD INFERENCES
I. Introduction

Congress has sanctioned the use of elections to determine whether or not employees wish to be represented by a labor organization for purN THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,

poses of collective bargaining.' It has been suggested that it was

the economic exigencies of the 1930's which led to the adoption
of this democratic means of resolving the problem of establishing
representational rights in the workplace. 2 In any event, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has, during the last 35
years, made the ballot, with its implications of order and stability,
available to over 25 million American workers. 3 Some may suppose that the bulk of union organization has already taken place
and that today the election function of the NLRB is relatively
unimportant. This is not the case. In fiscal 1968 the NLRB received 12,889 representation petitions, conducted 7,857 elections,
and brought the ballot to over 506,000 employees. 4 In an age
when it is fashionable to make disparaging statements about
bureaucratic ineptness, the commendable record of the NLRB
in the representation area should serve to protect this agency
5
from any serious criticism.
The purpose of this paper is to examine, through the use of
random sampling techniques, employee reactions to unions and
employers, and to examine the effectiveness of NLRB policies

followed in the regulation of representation elections.
The NLRB has taken the position that it has been endowed
by Congress with the general power to oversee the conduct of the
representation campaign." In furtherance of this objective the

1 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).

2 R. Fleming, "The Significance of the Wagner Act," in Labor and the New

Deal 123, 148-149 (1957).
3 Labor Relations Yearbook 311 (1969).
4 33 NLRB Ann. Rep., 10, 224-229 (1969).
5 Admittedly, the NLRB has not escaped criticism, but in recent years most
criticism of the Board has dealt with its administration of the unfair labor
practice provisions of the N.L.R.A. See, for example, Affeldt, Bargaining
Orders Without an Election: The National Labor Relations Board's "final
solution," 57 Ky. L. J. 151 (1969); Brown, NLRB and the Will of Congress:
Restoring the Balance of Power in Labor Relations, 73 Dick. L. Rev. 220
(1969); and Petro, Expertise, the NLRB and the Constitution: Things Abused
and Things Forgotten, 14 Wayne L. Rev. 1039 (1968).
6 Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 66, 69-70 (1962).
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Board has announced in its decisions over the years a series of
rules which should serve as a guide to the parties in ordering
their preelection conduct.
In General Shoe Corp.7 the Board announced its "laboratory
atmosphere" requirement for elections in which the "uninhibited
desires of the employees" could be registered. In any case in
which it appeared that the employees probably could not have
made a free choice, the Board would invalidate the election and
order a new election to be conducted.
Since 1941 the Board, with Supreme Court approval, 8 has set
aside elections in instances where the employer has made "coercive" statements. Situations involving promises (by employers) of benefits have been treated similarly by the Board.
In Dal-Tex Optical Company Inc.9 the NLRB announced that
it would examine "the economic realities of the employeremployee relationship and shall set aside an election where we
find that the employer's conduct has resulted in substantial interference with the election, regardless of the form in which the
statement was made." 10 There has been some criticism of the
Board's administration of the "total context" theory. The theory
is so general and ambiguous in nature that it is difficult for the
parties to anticipate how the Board will apply it. For example,
in Arch Beverage Corporation" an employer's letter to the electorate was attacked by the union because it contained an apparent threat to close the plant if the union was successful in its
organizational activities. The Board found the document unobjectionable when viewed in the total context of the letter. Similarly, in American Greetings Corporation12 the Board exonerated
an employer campaign which was built around "the inability of
strikes, loss of employment, and violence," 18 because of the relevance of the appeal to the issues before the employees. By contrast, in Storkline Corporation1 4 the election was set aside because the employer's central campaign theme was built around
fear. At least one NLRB Regional Director has commented upon
7 77 NLRB 124 (1948).
8 NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941).
9 137 NLRB 1782 (1962).
10 Id. at 1787.
11 140 NLRB 1385 (1963).
12 146 NLRB 1440 (1964).
13 Id. at 1441.
14 142 NLRB 875 (1963).
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the difficulty of applying the "total context" theory to a given
fact situation. His recommendation is that absent an independent
unfair labor practice "less confusion would result if the 'total
context' theory were not applied." 15
An NLRB regulatory technique that the authors chose to
test empirically was the "material misrepresentation" rule of
Hollywood Ceramics.1 6 The rule was stated by the Board as
follows:
"We believe that an election should be set aside only where
there has been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which involves a substantial departure from
the truth, at a time which prevents the other party or parties
from making an effective reply, so that the misrepresentation,
whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to
have a significant impact on the election. However, the mere
fact that a message is inartistically or vaguely worded and
subject to different interpretations will not suffice to establish such misrepresentation as would lead us to set the election aside. Such ambiguities, like extravagant promises, derogatory statements about the other party, and minor distortions of some facts, frequently occur in communication
between persons. But even where a misrepresentation is
shown to have been substantial, the Board may still refuse
to set aside the election if it finds upon consideration of all
the circumstances that the statement would not be likely to
have had a real impact on the election. For example, the
misrepresentation might have occurred in connection with
an unimportant matter so that it could only have a de
minimis effect. Or, it could have been so extreme as to put
the employees on notice of its lack of truth under the particular circumstances so they could not reasonably have relied on the assertion. Or the Board may find that the employees possessed independent knowledge with which to
evaluate the statements." 17 (Emphasis ours)
The point has been made by Director Cuneo that more reliance should be placed on the standards utilized in misrepresentation cases and much less placed on the "total context" approach.' 8 In conducting the research study that follows, the
authors placed before employees the issue of material misrepresentation and tested their reactions to this regulatory standard.
15 Cuneo, NLRB's Totality of Conduct Theory in Representation Elections
and Problems Involved in Its Application, 7 Duquesne L. Rev. 229, 235
(1969).
16 140 NLRB 221 (1962).
17

Id. at 224.

18

Supra note 15 at 238.
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Regional Director Bernard Samoff has recently noted a rising trend in inconclusive election results, an increase in the number of objections filed by employers, and an increase in the number of post-election reports on objections and challenges being
prepared by the agency's regional office. 19 Samoff believes that
Board elections, like their political counterparts, should result
in final, definitive, and unchallenged results. As a solution Samoff proposes hearty and unrestricted electioneering by the parties
with a right of equal access to the voter-employees. An innovator, Director Samoff favors less direct regulatory control of
election campaigns by the NLRB with more emphasis on pro20
cedural rules.
Director Samoff supports the position of Professor Bok, who
asserts that there is a lack of consensus on the proper role that
the law should play in the conduct of these elections. The difficulty in making reasoned judgments in this area stems from a
lack of an adequate understanding of employee voting behavior.
The issue of how much protection the voter-employees should receive from the Board is a key consideration here. 2 '
It is administratively impossible for the Board to elicit
testimony from all voters during the investigation of a disputed
election in order to gauge the effect of questioned preelection
tactics. Therefore the law has created a scheme of inferences of
"coercion" and "interference." The administrators who make
these inferences are in no way involved in the day-to-day conduct of the campaign. 22 The authors have attempted to test these
inferences by sampling employee-voter opinion on the objectionable conduct and on the Board's actions taken thereon. To the
best of the authors' knowledge sampling procedures have not
been utilized heretofore to verify the Board's inferences.
In 1967 Professor Brotslaw conducted a study of the voting
behavior of a group of retail workers involved in an NLRB election23 and analyzed the relationship between the employees' per19 Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. Penn. L. Rev.
228 (1968).
20

Id. at 251-252.

See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Board, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 40 (1964).
21

22

Id. at 40-41.

Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail Workers Toward Union Organization, 18
Lab. L. J. 149 (1967).
23
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sonal characteristics and their decisions in the election. The
authors have noted the research findings of Professor Brotslaw
and shall make reference to them at the appropriate times.
Director Samoff has challenged students of labor relations
to attempt an exploration and analysis of the factors bearing
upon workers' choices in NLRB elections. In this pilot study,
the authors have attempted to meet that challenge. There has
been very little empirical work done in this area and it would
appear that legal commentators could profitably utilize the survey approach to expand the body of knowledge in this field. It
seems highly desirable that this be done, since the decisions and
policies of the Board in representation matters directly influence
thousands of employees in a direct and immediate way. The law
of the representation election should not depend on supposition
and unsupported inferences. The regulatory decisions of the
NLRB should be grounded upon a body of knowledge gained,
at least in part, from direct contact with the employee electorate.
H. Methodology
In preparation for this pilot study the authors had discussions with employers, legal practitioners, and representatives of
the NLRB and labor organizations. In accordance with our
understanding with all of these persons, we shall not in the
course of this study identify any individual, labor organization,
or employer.
While all parties appeared interested in the results of the
authors' undertaking, there was understandable reluctance to
cooperate with the authors to the extent of making available
actual lists of employee names and addresses. After winning
a Board election an employer representative was reluctant to
have us "start something up again" in the shop. In another instance an employer attorney remarked that if his client's employees were asked to analyze why they voted "No" in a recent
election (which the union had lost) they might not be able to
justify their answer and might therefore vote for the union in
a subsequent election.
Reluctance to cooperate was by no means confined to the
employer side alone. One union demanded a right of censorship
over our question selection. In another case a union agent who
was currently organizing the plant in question was apprehensive
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of the effect of our research on his organizing campaign. In
short, neither side wished to jeopardize its present economic position. Normally, both the employer and union have made certain
"investments" in the employees. The nature of these investments
may be different, but they are looked upon as investments just
the same. Both parties are naturally reluctant to have any outside party endanger any gains made by them toward winning the
employees' loyalty and/or esteem.
In order to test both major areas of concern-attitudes of
employees toward unions and employers and employee reactions
to NLRB regulatory schemes (in the Hollywood Ceramics situation) -the authors sought out units in which an election had
been set aside in 1969 because of a material misrepresentation.
The unit for study ultimately chosen was the circulation
department employees of a large west-central New York state
newspaper publisher. The unit comprises about 500 employees,
a majority of whom are part-time workers, who handle the distribution of the published product throughout the geographic
area served by the publisher. Out of the 476 votes cast in the
NLRB election, the union received 137.
The questions were designed to sample employee attitudes
in the areas outlined above. 24 Ample space was provided on the
questionnaire for written comments and some of the responses
elicited will appear in the data analysis section of this Comment.
Due to the large number and dispersion of the population,
the conducting of personal interviews was impossible, and the
authors were forced to rely on the mail questionnaire to obtain
information. A cover letter, a two-page questionnaire, and a selfaddressed, stamped envelope were sent to 250 employees in the
unit. The cooperating labor organization made available to the
authors its addressograph plates, and from them the authors
selected a portion of the plates from each zip code represented.
Because of the confidentiality of the study, it was deemed
best not to send follow-up letters to the employees encouraging
their cooperation, since this might have given the employee an
erroneous feeling that he was a "marked man." Suspicion on
the part of the employees that the authors were really acting as
an agent of the employer or the union was surprisingly widespread and difficult to allay.
J. Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement 25-31
(1966).

24
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Response to mail questionnaires is often limited, and returns
of around 20% seem to be good.25 The authors received 52 completed questionnaires, and these form the basis of our reported
data.
Questionnaires nearly always pose problems of interpretation
for the researcher, especially in the area of nonresponses. Surveys of this type almost never provide a direct basis for characterizing the entire population. However such surveys are nevertheless valuable, since they do increase society's knowledge of
which they provide is
the subject matter, and the information
26
often obtainable by no other means.
The data presented will not enable the authors to make
broad generalizations about employee attitudes. However in an
area where many have been content to hypothesize and infer, the
authors have consulted the employee-electorate and have recorded their actual responses. It is submitted that in spite of the
limitations of the questionnaire device, this approach is a valuable means of gaining insights into areas where heretofore mere
theories have prevailed.
IH. Analysis of Data Concerning Employee Attitudes Toward
Unions and Employers
A. Personal Characteristicsand Voting Behavior
The circulation unit sampled herein is composed mainly of
part-time employees. Although the cooperating labor organization reported that women constitute a large percentage of the
unit, 82% of the respondents were male. Table One indicates
how these individuals voted in the election.

TABLE 1

Sex
Male
Female

Percentage
Reporting
82%
18%

Percentage
Vote in Election
For
For
Union
Company
39%
100%

25

W. Hanson and R. Brabb, Managerial Statistics 33 (1961).

20

D. Szulie, Statistical Methods 604-605 (1965).
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The cooperating union confirmed the finding of the authors
that the overwhelming majority of the female employees work
at home as counselors who oversee the distribution of the product
to the consumer. It can be thus inferred from Table One that
this category of employees voted heavily against organization.
That inference is strengthened by the comment of one female
respondent who observed:
"I was against the election for counselors. We do not
work in the plant but at home and I felt we could not benefit
from a union. We only make from $8 to $16 a week. Many
of the housewifes [sic] do not want to bother with union
dues out of so little ....

I believe the 166 counselors voted

'No,' thus stopping a union for full time circulation people.
They had more to gain than we did."
This comment by a part-time worker discloses several understandable objections to a union proposed and conceived mainly
for full-time employees. Obviously this part-timer distinguished
herself from the full-time workers, feeling that she did not have
a close community of interest with those employees working in
the plant. Furthermore, she objected to having to pay full union
dues when she was a part-time employee. She may have a valid
point here, especially if the cost to the union of servicing a parttime employee is less than that for servicing a full-timer. To
meet this objection, unions should perhaps experiment with a
flexible dues structure when faced with a substantial part-time
element in a unit, thereby more equitably apportioning their
costs and thereby augmenting their appeal to this group of employees. In addition, the respondent's comment suggests that in
the future unions would be well-advised to carefully set forth
in their preelection campaign the specific programs which will
benefit the part-time workers.
One part-time truck driver stated, "I voted against the
union because I believe the union would eliminate part-time
jobs." It appears that the union failed to communicate its concern for the preservation of the part-time segment of the unit.
Since this particular business relied extensively on part-time
help, this oversight was probably very costly to the union in
terms of part-time worker election support.
The age and educational distribution of the respondents
herein are set forth in Tables 2 and 3 respectively.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/5
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TABLE 2

Age Group

Frequency
2
4
10
16
16
4

Under 19 years
19-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65

Vote in Election
For
For
Union
Company
-

2

-

4
4
4
10
-

6
12
6
4

Table 2 suggests that the union did better among younger
employees than was the case in the Brotslaw study.2 7 The
union's appeal to the middle age groups was lower except among
the 46-55 group. The 56-65 group was composed of long-term
employees who also believed themselves very secure in their jobs
(see Table 10). While it might be thought that unions offer older
employees greater security in the form of pensions, etc., a longterm nonunion employee may feel that he already has adequate
security and does not need union protection.

TABLE 3
Educational
Level

Frequency

9th or Less
10th
11th
12th
Some College

6
4
20
22

Vote in Election
For
For
Union
Company
-

-

4
2
12
10

2
2
8
12

B. Work Relationship Data and Voting Behavior
The correlation between length of service with the employer
and voting behavior is set forth in Table 4.
27

Supra note 23 at 158.
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TABLE 4
Years With
Employer
2 and Under
3 to 7
8 to 11
12 and Over

Frequency

Vote in Election
For
For
Company
Union

22
10
8
12

14
2
2
8

8
8
6
4

All of the employees with twelve or more years of service
with the company were 47 years of age or older. As indicated
earlier, an older employee with long tenure may tend to view
his employer as a guardian of his security interests. If this is
true, then a union interested in organizing the older, long-service
employees would be well advised to disregard the security issue
and to stress other matters in its campaign.
The voting behavior of full and part-time employees is recorded below.

TABLE 5
Employment
Status
Full time
Part time

Frequency

Vote in Election
For
For
Company
Union

16
36

8
20

8
16

The average length of service for full-time employees was
approximately 20 years, while the comparable figure for parttime employees was about 3 years.
C. Past Experience With Labor Organizations
TABLE 6
PriorUnion
Membership
Yes
No

Frequency
24
28

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/5
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The authors asked those respondents who indicated that they
had previously belonged to a labor organization whether they
had been generally satisfied with the quality of representation
provided by that organization. Of those persons responding, 16
indicated that they were satisfied and 8 identified this fact as
an important determinative of how they voted in the election
under study. Eight persons expressed dissatisfaction with their
previous union experience and 4 of them took this fact into
account in voting against the union in the election. The authors'
data supports that of Brotslaw in suggesting a connection between previous experience with unions and later voting behavior.

2

D. Family Influence on Voting Behavior
At least one writer has taken the position that an important
determinant of voting behavior is an individual's family attitudes
and experiences. 2 9 The author's results are inconclusive on this
point. Our data reveals that eighteen respondents did state that
they discussed the election with members of their family; however, 8 of this number disclosed that these conversations had
only "very slight" impact on their ultimate voting decision. The
data would seem to indicate that the respondents did not rely in
large measure on family persuasion in their voting. This finding
is somewhat contrary to Brotslaw's conclusion that there is a
union attitudes and the
degree of correlation between family
30
election decisions of family members.
E. Influence of Fellow Employees on Voting Choice
Nearly all of the respondents surveyed stated that they
spoke with fellow employees on the question of union organization of the unit. Six termed the discussions "highly persuasive,"
18 characterized them as "helpful," and 18 described them as
having "very slight" effect on their vote.
The data suggests that since a majority of the respondents
considered these conversations with their colleagues influential
on their voting decisions, a union or company campaign should
take into account this group spirit factor. It seems probable that
28

Id. at 160.

S. Wahl, "Psychiatry and the Group Sciences," in American Voting Behavior 262, 269 (1959).
30 Supra note 23 at 159.
29
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this "group dynamics" influence has, to some extent, a bandwagon effect on employees' decision making.
F. Relations with Employer Personnel and Voting Behavior
Employees reported that on 22 occasions in the recent past
they have brought a personal problem to their supervisor or
other member of management. Twelve employees found their
conversation with the management representative to be helpful,
and ten did not. The majority of these 22 employees voted for
the union, which discloses that employees who feel comfortable
enough with management to bring a personal problem to them
for assistance do not necessarily vote for the employer in a representation election.
Social contacts between supervisors and respondent employees were virtually nonexistent in our sample, which indicates that social mingling is apparently not a significant factor
in producing election preferences for the employer.
Thirty employees revealed that during the preceding 12
month period they have discussed an objectionable management
policy or decision with their supervisor. The reception that was
accorded them can be related to the way they voted by means
of Table 7.

TABLE 7
Point of View
Given Fair
Consideration
Yes
No

Frequency
10
20

Vote in Election
For
For
Company
Union
8
2

2
18

Table 7 suggests that the degree of "fairness" attributed to
the employer by the employee was an important factor in the
way that the employee voted in the election. It must however be
noted that the employer may actually have acted reasonably or
equitably with respect to the employee complaint, although the
employee did not think so. The important consideration is not
whether the employer acted justly, but rather, whether the employee believed the employer acted justly. Another possible interpretation of Table 7 is the following: Employees dissatisfied
with the employer and receptive to the union's message are prone
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/5
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to be somewhat critical of employer policies. When their complaint is not met by management, it serves only to reinforce their
feelings of overall dissatisfaction with the employer.
When asked whether they believed that they could deal
more effectively with the employer if represented by a union,
the employees answered as follows:
TABLE 8
Can Disagreewith
Employer More Safely
Frequency
with Union
28
24

Yes
No

Vote in Election
For
For
Union
Company
24
4

4
20

It appears from Tables 7 and 8 that, in general, employees
who believe that they can "safely" communicate dissatisfaction
with employer decisions and policies and whose opinions are
accorded (in the employees' judgment) fair consideration by
management are likely to vote in favor of the employer in the
election. This should indicate to employers the practical importance of transmitting a genuine attitude of receptiveness to those
employees who see fit to question some management determination.
One respondent clearly expressed the importance he attaches
to employer treatment of employees:
"Ever since the union was voted down . . . we have been
treated much worse ... we dare not complain about any sit-

uation or refuse what we feel is unfair work for fear of an
oral threat of losing our jobs. Fringe benefits are very good,
but do not make up for unfair treatment ...

"

(Emphasis

original.)
The authors' data generally supports the conclusion of Professor Brotslaw: "Employee dissatisfaction is an excellent foundation upon which to develop sentiment favorable to union
organization and collective bargaining." a3
Unions might exploit such dissatisfaction by emphasizing in
their campaign the futility of "bucking the boss." However, the
issue probably should be treated with some caution, for if the
union paints the employees as a herd of docile sheep, it may
81 Id. at 169.
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anger and alienate the very persons whose allegiance it is seeking to gain.
Approximately half of the participants stated that they could
deal effectively with their employer without the assistance of
a union. The employees' conception of employer economic power
is revealed in Table 9.

TABLE 9
Does Employer have
Economic Power
over Employees?
Yes
No

Frequency
36
16

Vote in Election
For
For
Company
Union
14
14

22
2

All of the "No" votes registered in Table 9 were cast by
part-time employees who supported the company in the election.
It is interesting to note that while superior employer economic
power has been one of the classic justifications for the NLRB's
regulation of elections, 32 this factor did not inexorably inspire
the employees to vote for the union. Table 9 shows that nearly
half of the "Yes" respondents voted for the company. When
asked whether they feared the employer's economic power, the
employees responded in a manner that closely paralleled the figures contained in Table 9. Again, however, the large "Yes" response did not produce a corresponding majority of union votes
in the election.
G. Job Security and Voting Behavior
Although 36 employees indicated that a union was necessary
to protect individual employment rights, less than half of this
group voted for the company. The authors noted the same pattern when analyzing Table 9, dealing with employer economic
power. It is generally thought that redress of the power balance
and protection of job rights are weighty reasons for supporting
a union. However while the respondents were aware of these
classic justifications for organization, nearly half of them ultimately supported the company. It appears that other more per32

Supra note 19 at 235-236.
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suasive factors often overshadowed the traditional notions when
it came time to make the final voting decision.
The employees were asked how they believed unions should
treat job rights in the plant. Four respondents felt that management should clear all changes with the union, 30 felt that the
company should consult with the -union before implementing any
changes, and 4 believed that management need only notify the
union of changes taking place.
When asked how secure the employee felt his job to be, the
respondents answered as follows:

TABLE 10
Security of Job

Frequency

Very Secure
Not Very Secure
In Jeopardy

30
14
8

Vote in Election
For
For
Company
Union
22
6
0

8
8
8

An employee's support for a union seems to follow his
evaluation of his own individual job security. The more secure
he perceives his job to be, the less likely he is to support a union.
H. Wages and Voting Behavior
TABLE 11
1. Do unionized
employees get
higher wages?
Yes
No

Frequency
32
20

Vote in Election
For
For
Company
Union
10
18

22
2

2. Do employees need
a union to get
a fair wage?
Yes
No
The figures contained in sections 1 and 2 of Table 11 seem to
reflect some inconsistent thinking, and the authors are unable to
advance a rational explanation for the figures. It is possible that
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1970
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the participants felt that a "fair" wage was obtainable without
a union but that a union could procure a "higher" wage than
unorganized employees could secure.
When asked for their views on the appropriate wage policy
to be followed by the union in dealing with the company, 26 respondents stated that unions should protect the highest number
of jobs regardless of the effect on the resulting wage rate. Only
10 employees thought that unions should bargain for the highest
wage possible and ignore the effect on employment levels.
One participant commented that while unions were a necessary institution at one time in our history, currently they "are
too powerful-their demands for higher wages and fringe benefits is [sic] causing in great part the inflation we are now experiencing." This same individual stated that union dues in his
opinion were too high for the services that are provided members.
I. Fringe Benefits and Voting Behavior
Of those responding to a question concerning the relative
importance of fringe benefits (insurance, pensions, paid vacations) to hourly wages, 14 responded that the fringes were
"very important," 26 believed them "equally important" with
hourly wages, and 12 expressed a preference for the "highest possible" wages. When asked if unions overemphasize fringe
benefits at the expense of higher hourly wages, 16 of the respondents answered in the affirmative and 26 replied in the negative. Of the 16 voting in the affirmative, 12 cast their ballot in
the election for the company. The respondents split equally on
the question of whether in their experience employers in nonunion firms pay substantial attention to fringe benefits for their
employees.
J. Working Conditions and Voting Behavior
The 24 employees who indicated that employers provide for
adequately safe and pleasant working conditions voted overwhelmingly for the company in the election. Those (20) who
thought employers remiss in this area heavily supported the
union. Thirty-two respondents did not feel that unions should
devote their resources to collective bargaining on improving
working conditions at the expense of higher wages and greater
fringe benefits.
In general employees supporting the employer felt that they
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/5
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could bring enough pressure to bear on the employer to improve
unsanitary or unsafe working conditions. Union adherents usually believed that they needed the intervention of a union to
accomplish this objective.
K. Miscellaneous FactorsBearing on Voting Behavior
An overwhelming majority (36 to 14) of the participants
took the position that unions ought not to concern themselves
with such issues as plant expansion and the introduction of new
product lines. These employees apparently do not support union
intervention into these areas of traditional managerial responsibility.
On the issue of union militancy in the plant, approximately
half of those answering preferred a strong vibrant organization
which would nevertheless allow the efficient operation of the
plant. The participants believed by a ratio of 3 to 1 that a union
should act as a stabilizing influence in the plant.
The data revealed that employees do not generally look
upon unions as a source of status or prestige. By a ratio of over
10 to 1 the participants stated that belonging to a union would
not serve to enhance their social status.
IV. Data Concerning the "Hollywood Ceramics" Type
of Material Misrepresentation
As previously noted, the NLRB has taken the position that
it will set aside an election and order a new one only when a
campaign communication was a substantial departure from the
truth, came at a time that precluded effective rebuttal, and would
reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the electorate.3 3 The Board reasons that because of the substantial misrepresentation perpetrated by party "X," which untruth party Y
had insufficient time to answer, there was probably a shift of
voter allegiance or support from Y to X. When such a situation
arises, X's election victory is nullified and the election is rerun
by the NLRB.
In fiscal year 1968 the NLRB conducted 202 rerun representation elections,3 4 and in only 30% of them was the outcome
Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 NLRB 221 (1962).
In fairness it must be pointed out that these elections were originally set
aside not only because of material misrepresentations but also because of
additional reasons that the Board considers relevant in determining whether
to set aside an election.
33

34
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of the original election reversed. 35 Based on these statistics,
which to our knowledge have not varied much over the years,
one would conclude that it is difficult to second-guess an employee's vote by gauging the impact of a particular communication on his electoral decision.
In the case studied the company was found to have violated
the Hollywood Ceramics misrepresentation standard, and so the
NLRB set the election aside. The authors examined the survey
participants who indicated that they voted for the company, and
attempted to determine the impact of the employer's communication on their vote. The fundamental question to be answered
was: does the sample reveal any significant reliance by the respondents on the improper assertions of the employer? An
affirmative answer would support the conclusion of the NLRB
that the communication had a substantial impact on the election.
The background facts comprising the context of the misrepresentation can be briefly stated. An employer pamphlet entitled "Now Ask Yourself" was prepared and distributed by mail
to all employees within a week before the election. The Union
did not learn of the pamphlet's existence until about 36 hours
before the start of the election.
In a section entitled "What is the [Union] record?" the
booklet discusses a situation in Yonkers, New York involving
the same employer and union. The pamphlet contains the following statement: "In Yonkers the [Union] won an election in Circulation a year ago, still has no contract, has not bargained in six
months, and because of this these employees have not had a pay
increase in 18 months." In post-election objections to the NLRB
the union argued that the quoted statement was a misrepresentation of the facts, since the Board had within a week of the election found the Yonkers employer guilty of an illegal refusal to
bargain.
The Regional Director of the NLRB agreed with this union
contention. He commented:
"The Board, of course, seeks to give employees the opportunity to cast their ballots for or against labor organizations
in an atmosphere conducive to the sober and informed exercise of the franchise, free not only from interference, restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but also free from
other elements which prevent or impede a reasoned choice.
Where the proper laboratory conditions have been jeopard35 Supra note 4 at 221.
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ized by material misrepresentations, the Board has not hesitated to set elections aside .... I am satisfied that the Employer's remarks regarding the bargaining situation in Yonkers, New York . . . violated those standards."

36

The Regional Director described the union's ability to function in the collective bargaining relationship as being of "vital
importance to employees during an organizational campaign."
He added: "A misrepresentation with respect to these material
matters tends to impede such a reasoned choice and destroy the
requisite laboratory conditions." 37 (Emphasis ours.) The Regional Director stated further that the employer's remarks were
"calculated to lead employees to believe that the failure of the
Yonkers' employees to receive a pay increase for 18 months was
due to the Union's ineptness and ineffectiveness. However ...
the actual reason for failure to reach agreement at Yonkers was
the Employer's unlawful refusal to bargain." 38
Considering now the results of the authors' survey, all respondents-both company and union voters-recalled receiving
and reading a copy of "Now Ask Yourself." They were then
asked: (1) whether at the time of the election they knew that
collective bargaining had been suspended in Yonkers pending the
outcome of the unfair labor practice case; and (2) whether they
really believed that the union's failure to bargain a contract was
due to its inability to properly represent its membership. The
results appear in Table 12.
TABLE 1239

Company Voter
No
Yes

Union Voter
No
Yes

1. Coll. barg. suspension
pending ULP decision

6

10

4

18

2. Union bargaining failure
in Yonkers ascribable
to ineptness

2

14

6

16

36
37
38

3 RC 4515.
Id.
Id.

39 The variation in the total number of responses in the following Tables

dealing with the misrepresentation issue is due to omissions by the respondents.
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When asked if they cared in any way about the situation in
Yonkers, the respondents replied as follows:

TABLE 13
Company Voter
No
Yes
Care about
Yonkers situation

2

20

Union Voter
Yes
No
12

8

The participants were then asked whether the employer's
misrepresentation had any effect on the way they voted in the
election. The results appear in Table 14:

TABLE 14
Company Voter
No
Yes
Effect on Vote

4

14

Union Voter
No
Yes
2

20

After considering Tables 12, 13, and 14 the authors venture
the following observations:
It seems true that few employees-either company or union
supporters-had any knowledge of the pending unfair labor practice proceeding between the parties at the Yonkers' unit. However, while the Regional Director may have been correct in assuming employee ignorance of the unfair labor practice proceeding, he was apparently in error when he further assumed that
the employees would infer that the union was inept and ineffective. Neither company nor union voters (Table 12) tended to
believe from the employer communication that the union was unable to effectively represent its members in Yonkers. This contradicts the Regional Director's findings.
Furthermore, Table 13 reveals that the overwhelming majority of company voters (who were supposedly hoodwinked by the
employer's misrepresentation) did not attach any real importance
to the Yonkers situation. The coup de grace to the Regional Director's inference process in this proceeding seems to be found
in Table 14, which discloses that the employer's misstatement did
not have any effect on the way the great majority of company
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/5
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voters voted in the election. In the words of Hollywood Ceramics, it appears that the employer communication had little
if any of the "significant impact" necessary to set aside the election. Thus the limited empirical data obtained in this study suggest that
4o in this case the union objections should have been over-

ruled.

An additional instance of misrepresentation was also relied
upon by the Regional Director in setting aside the election. This
was another statement appearing in the booklet "Now Ask Yourself." The section in question is entitled "What About Job Security?" In this section the employer comments upon the discharge of two employees in the newsroom of the plant; these employees were represented by the union. The booklet states:
"Consider what the [Union] could do when it was the agent
when two newsroom employees were fired. Answer: Nothing ....

Your performance is what guarantees your job. No

union can guarantee it...."
The NLRB investigation revealed that the union had objected
to one of the discharges and settled the matter by entering into
an agreement with the company, whereby the employee was
allowed to keep his severance pay and the discharge was listed
on the records as a resignation. The second discharge was due
to alcoholism and was not protested by the union.
The Regional Director concluded that the employer had, by
making this misstatement, violated the Hollywood Ceramics
standards. The Director said that the union's ability to function
as an effective grievance representative was of "vital importance
to employees." He added that the union did effectively represent
one of the employees and declared, "The assertion that the Union
did nothing amounts to a material misrepresentation." 41
Our data concerning this issue appears in Tables 15 and 16:
The authors wish to emphasize that this analysis is not intended as a
criticism of the Regional Director's handling of the case. The Director involved is held in high professional repute by practitioners in his region and
has the respect of the authors, one of whom has been privileged to work
under his direction. The discussion is intended merely to raise questions
about the reliability of the inference theory approach.
40

41

3 RC 4515.
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TABLE 15
Company Voter
No
Yes

Union Voter
Yes
No

1. Did you feel that the Union
would do nothing regarding
the discharges?

2. Did you know that the Union
did actually file a grievance
in this matter?

6

12

8

8

-

20

16

4

TABLE 16
Company Voter
No
Yes
Did the employer's statement
have any influence on you
in the way you voted
in the election?

4

16

Union Voter
No
Yes

6

16

The data indicates that a large majority of the supposedly
deceived company voters did not believe that the union would sit
idly by and fail to protest the newsroom discharges. Half of the
company voters responded that they knew the union had fied
a grievance over the discharge. Table 15 suggests that the company voters were able to properly evaluate this statement and
that in fact very few were misled by the statement. Table 16
reveals the very significant point that only one fifth of the company voters were influenced in their voting decision by the employer's statement. Accordingly, it appears that this ground for
setting aside the election was also unsound, since this communication evidently did not have "significant impact" on the electorate. The inference that there was substantial interference with
the voters' free choice seems unwarranted by the data compiled
in the authors' study.
Conceding that the weight to be attached to one study is not
very substantial, nevertheless it is at least possible, if not probable, that the NLRB's reliance on its inference theory in misrepresentation cases is not justified by the facts.
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V. Employee Attitudes Toward the Regulation of Elections
by the NLRB
Regional Director Samoff has stated that the NLRB ought
to recognize the similarity between the citizen-voter in political
elections and the employee-voter in representation elections and
appropriately revamp its regulatory framework to allow for more
certainty of results in NLRB elections. 42 In essence he recommends more unrestricted campaigning by the parties and a narrowing of the grounds upon which the NLRB will set aside an
election.
The authors believed that it would be enlightening to sample
employee viewpoints concerning the role of the NLRB in overseeing the election process. By a 6 to 1 ratio, employees favored
existing NLRB regulation of campaign tactics. Many of the participants implied that they favored even more supervision by the
NLRB over the parties than is now undertaken. One employee
said that the NLRB keeps the parties "on their toes" and discourages them "from pulling sneaky tricks." Another employee
asserted that both sides made "false statements of fact" and that
the NLRB should carefully regulate the campaign "so people can
know the truth." One respondent declared that the NLRB
should investigate campaign booklets and leaflets "for their
validity." This same employee added that there were so many
charges and counter-charges between the parties that the whole
process tended "to confuse the worker."
A third employee saw a distinction between the virtually
unregulated political elections and representation elections. He
observed, "Public opinion polices political election; union-management elections are not so policed." Two other respondents felt
that the NLRB's role was to insure a "fairer election."
Professor Bok, 4 3 Director Samoff, 44 and others have suggested face-to-face debates between the parties as an alternative to
more extensive campaign regulation. One respondent seemed to
be recommending just such a procedure when he requested that
the NLRB provide "a truthful and lucid picture of both pros and
cons in order to alleviate pressure on the voter." This sentiment
was echoed by another participant, who wrote: "No employee
(ever) knew the truth." The latter further indicated that the
42

Supra note 19 at 228-231.

43

Supra note 21 at 91-92.
note 19 at 249.

44 Supra
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NLRB regulatory scheme should make available to the voter
"a more honest appraisal" of the parties' positions.
Thus it appears that the employees desire that the NLRB
hold a fairly tight rein on the parties during campaign time.
VI. Conclusions
Bearing in mind the caveat that only tentative generalizations and limited inferences can be drawn from sample surveys
of the type employed herein, the authors have reached the
following conclusions:
1. Part-time employees working short hours may not perceive
a community of interests between themselves and the regular
full-time workers. Part-time employees also may question the
equity of a flat-rate union dues structure. A union must
clearly manifest its concern for part-time employees if it is
to overcome their skepticism and win their allegiance.
2. Union "security" arguments may not be persuasive to older,
long-term, nonunion employees, for many in this group apparently feel that they can prudently rely on their employer
for job protection.
3. Past favorable experience with labor unions tends to persuade an employee to support a union in an NLRB election.
4. Reliance on family experience with unions does not seem to
be a significant determinative factor in the election decisions
of employees.
5. Personal and social association between employer personnel
and employee voters does not appear to be an important consideration in the latter's election decision-making process.
6. The extent of effective complaint communication between
employee and supervisor seems to be a significant factor in
the employees' election decision.
7. The fact that an employer has great economic power does not
by itself substantially increase the likelihood that the employees will embrace a union.
8. The individual employee's conception of his own job security
with the employer tends to influence his vote for or against
a union.
9. Satisfaction with present working conditions tends to induce
the employees to support the employer in a representation
election.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss2/5

24

Fitzgerald and Froelke: An Examination of Two Aspects of the NLRB Election

242

3 AKRON LAW REVIEW (2)

Spring 1970

The authors attempted in this pilot study to sample as wide
a substantive area as feasible. This was done partly to dramatize
the scope of the subject matter which needs legal-empirical
investigation. It is hoped that legally-trained individuals will
undertake further empirical research in this area.
WILLIAM H. FTZGERALD

and
D. RicHARD FROELKE*

* Although Mr. Froelke is an employee of the NLRB, the views expressed
in this Comment do not represent the official position of the NLRB.
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